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THE SECESSION OF THE SUCCESSFUL: THE
RISE OF AMAZON AS PRIVATE GLOBAL
CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATOR
Jane K. Winn*

In 2005, the Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions (“AFFECT”)
coalition issued a list of 12 principles it hoped would contribute to a new consensus
about what constitutes fairness in online consumer transactions. A decade later, a
cursory review of different jurisdictions indicates that, while there has been little
discernable progress in the direction of the principles in the United States, other
jurisdictions such as the European Union have made more progress. However, the
one jurisdiction in the world that comes closest to implementing all 12 principles
across the full spectrum of consumer transactions is not a government at all, but
Amazon acting as a private regulator. Amazon’s status as a regulator arises out of
its ownership of a “multi-sided platform” that acts as a global retail marketplace.
The rise of global platforms such as Amazon, Google, Apple, Facebook, and
Microsoft that own global online marketplaces and simultaneously act as their
primary regulators calls to mind the “Secession of the Successful” described by
Robert Reich in 1991—the withdrawal from civil society of the wealthy and powerful
into private gated communities. Amazon’s status as the primary de facto regulator
of the marketplace it owns combined with its single-minded pursuit of customer
satisfaction contributes to relations with its employees and suppliers that are often
profoundly problematic. When a platform operator is also the primary regulator of
the market it creates, negative spillover effects may occur: squeezing employees and
suppliers to insure that consumers get whatever they want merely pushes conflict
from one part of the platform “ecosystem” to another. When this occurs, it does not
make online commerce fairer overall, which was the implicit goal of the 12
principles. Although transaction-level norms such as those found in the 12
principles cannot ensure that all stakeholders in online marketplaces are treated
fairly, other forms of regulation might be more effective in contributing to that goal.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2005, Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions
(“AFFECT”) issued a list of 12 principles that it hoped would renew public dialogue
about how the legal framework of electronic commerce could promote fairness in
online consumer transactions. 1 Jean Braucher played a leading role in the
development of the principles and in their subsequent dissemination. 2 This Article
revisits those principles a decade later in light of the rise of global platforms such as
Amazon that now dominate online retail markets. It also explores the question of
which regulatory strategies would be best suited to advance the broader social justice
ideals that Professor Braucher championed, and that underlie the 12 principles, in
light of these changed circumstances. This Article was first presented at a
symposium at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law
celebrating Professor Braucher’s life and work.
The AFFECT coalition was formed by opponents of the Uniform Computer
Information Transaction Act, a legislative project that started out as part of the
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) revision process but was later completed as a
separate uniform law.3 When the original version of the UCC was completed in the
1950s, “software” as something separate from the hardware of computing
machinery had not been invented, let alone become the subject of a major category
of commercial transactions.4 After efforts during the 1990s to create a commercial
law governing software and information transactions became hopelessly bogged
down in political controversy, almost all state legislatures rejected it. 5 The 12
principles of fair electronic commerce represented an effort to shift the focus of

1.
Jean Braucher, New Basics: Twelve Principles for Fair Commerce in MassMarket Software and Other Digital Products, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE
‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 183 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
2.
Id. at 178.
3.
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE
LAWS
2002),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/computer_information_transactions/ucita_final_0
2.pdf.
4.
Id. at 1.
5.
Braucher, supra note 1, at 180–82.
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debate away from that debacle and toward building a consensus regarding what
constitutes “fair dealing” for trade in digital products and electronic commerce.6
A decade after the 12 principles were issued, a cursory review of different
legal systems indicates that progress in the direction of the 12 principles has been
modest at best. While American consumer protection laws have generally been
subject to creeping obsolescence as a result of technological innovation, the
European Union has repeatedly revised its consumer and data protection laws to
ensure their continued efficacy. 7 Neither jurisdiction, however, has clearly
embraced the principles. By contrast, the one jurisdiction that arguably comes
closest to implementing all of the 12 principles in online consumer transactions
generally is not a government at all, but Amazon acting as a private regulator.
Amazon is the largest American Internet retailer by a large margin, as well
as one of the largest retailers in America.8 In addition, Amazon operates the Amazon
Marketplace where independent retailers offer products for sale. It has one of the
most efficient logistics systems in the world for its own products, and also provides
logistical support—including order fulfillment, delivery, payment processing, and
web hosting services—for Amazon Marketplace sellers. As part of its brand
management strategy, Amazon maintains an intense focus on customer satisfaction
and requires participants in the Amazon Marketplace to do the same. 9 In other
words, Amazon’s customers do not need to worry about whether their national
consumer protection laws have been updated to address online commerce issues
because they know Amazon has staked its reputation on making sure that its
customers are always treated fairly. The same cannot be said of Amazon’s suppliers
or employees, however. Amazon has been criticized for abusing its power as a
monopsonist in some markets and for the harsh treatment of its employees.10

6.
Id. at 182–83.
7.
See Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 October 2011 on Consumer Rights, Amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive
85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2011 O.J.
(L 304/64); see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final
(Jan.
25,
2012),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_am_art_3091/comp_am_art_30-91en.pdf.
8.
Phil Wahba, Amazon Ranks Among Retail’s 10 Biggest Companies for the
First Time, FORTUNE (July 1, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/07/01/10-largestretailers-amazon/;
Running
Away,
WALL
ST.
J.,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323324904579041300287558882.
9.
George Anders, Jeff Bezos Reveals His No. 1 Leadership Secret, FORBES (Apr.
4, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2012/0423/ceo-compensation-12-amazontechnology-jeff-bezos-gets-it.html; Joe Nocera, Put Buyers First? What a Concept, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008, at C1.
10.
Paul Krugman, Amazon’s Monopsony Is Not O.K., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2014,
at A25; Spencer Soper, Amazon Worker Forces Changes as Labor Board Settles Claim,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2014, 3:56 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-1118/amazon-settles-labor-board-complaint-on-workers-rights; David Streitfeld, Inside
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In 1991, Robert Reich published an essay in the New York Times Sunday
Magazine entitled The Secession of the Successful.11 Reich described the growing
concentration of wealth in American society in the hands of what he called the
“fortunate top fifth” of the population, and this group’s increasing withdrawal into
private gated communities, private schools, private security forces, and private
infrastructure. 12 This withdrawal, in turn, impoverishes civil society in America,
making the political challenges it faces even more intractable. While Reich was
describing the migration of wealthy individuals into private geographical spaces, a
similar migration occurs when economically powerful players withdraw into private
regulatory orders that define global markets. Due to a limited interface between
those private regulatory orders and the national legal systems from which they grew,
private regulators can focus on maximizing value to shareholders while avoiding the
broad range of duties a national legal system must accommodate.
This rise of private global regulators and erosion of national legal systems
has been studied through various lenses, including transnational business
governance, 13 global administrative law, 14 global legal pluralism, 15 transnational
legal orders,16 new governance and smart regulation,17 global private regulation,18
and democratic experimentalism.19 These studies have highlighted many different
aspects of the transformation of legal systems in response to the rise of global
markets and accelerating pace of technological innovation. However, none of these
Amazon’s Very Hot Warehouse, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Sept. 19, 2011, 6:12 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/inside-amazons-very-hot-warehouse/.
11.
Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 20,
1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/20/magazine/secession-of-thesuccessful.html?pagewanted=all.
12.
Id.
13.
Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational Business Governance Interactions:
Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 1–21 (2014).
14.
See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 27–29 (2005).
15.
Paul Schiff Berman, From Legal Pluralism to Global Legal Pluralism, in
LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL
255 (Richard Nobels & David Schiff eds., 2014); Ralf Michaels, Globalization and Law: Law
Beyond the State, in LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 287 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2d
ed. 2013); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to
Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008).
16.
See Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3–6 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).
17.
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (1992); NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART
REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998); LESTER M. SALAMON, The New
Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT:
A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
18.
See TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011); M. Patrick Cottrell & David
M. Trubek, Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, and
Deliberation in Global Space, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 359 (2012).
19.
See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
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studies have focused on the role of information and communication technology
(“ICT”) networks or global “multi-sided platforms” in the governance of global
markets.20 Once ICT networks have been launched successfully, they are difficult to
unseat, an advantage that may give the operator of a successful network considerable
leverage over users of that network. 21 Global technology companies—such as
Amazon, Google, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft—have rapidly achieved
enormous market power as ICT networks. They have further amplified that power
by adopting a multi-sided platform business model, which requires complementary
“sides” such as consumers and retailers, or users and advertisers, to participate in
their platforms. 22 These platform operators can exercise considerable private
regulatory authority over the global “ecosystems” that the operation of their
platforms has spawned.
The ability of these platform operators to act as private regulators with
authority over the global online marketplaces they have created calls to mind
Reich’s description in 1991 of the withdrawal of the wealthy and powerful from
civil society into private gated communities. 23 Amazon’s status as the primary
regulator of its own marketplace combined with its single-minded pursuit of
customer satisfaction often produces profoundly problematic relations with
employees and suppliers.24 When a platform operator is also its primary regulator,
negative spillover effects may occur. In particular, squeezing employees and
suppliers to ensure that consumers get whatever they want merely pushes conflict
from one part of the platform “ecosystem” to another; it does not make online
commerce fairer, which was the goal of the 12 principles.
Although transaction-level norms such as those found in the 12 principles
cannot ensure that all stakeholders in online markets are treated fairly, other forms
of regulation might be more effective in achieving that goal. Shifting the focus of
efforts to make markets operate more fairly from the level of specific contract terms
to the broader relationship between national legal systems and global private
regulators might be a more effective regulatory strategy. For example, the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 promotes fairness in global commerce
by mandating disclosure of efforts to abolish forced labor in global production
networks. If global retailers such as Amazon and Walmart were required to disclose
to consumers whether their employees and suppliers had earned a “living wage,”

20.
21.

OZ SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES (2001).
See id. at 155–59; see also HAL R. VARIAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 21–25 (2004).
22.
Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, Multi-Sided Platforms, 43 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
162, 162–63 (2015); Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP.
125, 126–29 (2009).
23.
Reich, supra note 11.
24.
Jodi Kantor & David Streitfeld, Inside Amazon: Wrestling Big Ideas in a
Bruising Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2015, at A1. But see Krishnadev Calamur, A
Blistering Response from Amazon, ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2015, 3:15 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/amazon-responds-new-yorktimes/411232/ (noting that Amazon questioned the accuracy of the New York Times’ reporting
and provided evidence calling into question the reliability of some sources).
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then these global retailers might have stronger incentives to ensure that the treatment
of different stakeholder groups was more balanced.

I. PLATFORM AS GOVERNANCE
In 2015, Amazon together with Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and
Alibaba, comprised a small, elite group of businesses that operated global platforms.
The word platform in this sense has been defined in the following terms:
The platform, created and maintained by one or more
intermediaries, encompasses components and rules employed by
users in most of their interactions. Users’ interactions are subject
to network effects, which are demand-side economies of scale: the
value of platform affiliation for any given user depends upon the
number of other users with whom they can interact. 25
A platform business strategy has been defined as, “the mobilization of a networked
business platform to expand into and operate in a given market. A business platform,
in turn, is a nexus of rules and infrastructure that facilitate interactions among
network users.”26
Out of the five most valuable brands in the world in 2015, four were
platforms in this sense: Apple, Google, IBM, and Microsoft.27 Samsung, Facebook,
Amazon, Cisco, Oracle, and Intel were included in the top 20 most valuable brands
of 2015, and are also considered platforms in this sense. 28
Computer networks are an essential element of platforms. Economists have
defined networks as markets characterized by complementarity (i.e., what
consumers value are systems made up of multiple products), compatibility (i.e., the
different products making up a system are interoperable), and interoperability
standards. 29 Markets based on networks have certain special characteristics that
make launching a viable network very difficult, which in turn makes displacing a
successful network difficult once it is in place. 30 These special characteristics
include consumption externalities—i.e., the utility of a product to one consumer
depends on how many other consumers are using the same product. 31 Another
special characteristic is the high risk of user “lock-in” once a network has been
launched successfully: If the switching costs involved in moving from one system
to another are high, then users may find themselves “locked in” to the old system
even if a new, better system becomes available. 32 Networks are also subject to
25.
Thomas R. Eisenmann et al., Platform Envelopment, 32 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
1270, 1273 (2011).
26.
Geoffrey Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Platform Strategy 1 (Bos. U.
Sch. of Mgmt., Research Paper No. 2439323, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439323.
27.
The
World’s
Most
Valuable
Brands,
FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/powerful-brands/list/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
28.
Id.
29.
SHY, supra note 20, at 1–2.
30.
Id. at 3–6.
31.
Id. at 3–4; see also VARIAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 33–37.
32.
Examples of switching costs include the cost of researching alternatives to the
current system and weighing the costs and benefits of switching (“search costs”); the human
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significant economies of scale in production. Many products distributed over
networks such as software or digital media also have extremely high up-front
development costs but a marginal production cost approaching zero.33
As a result of innovations in the technology of computer networks, what
were once public marketplaces can now be operated as privately owned multi-sided
platforms, in effect privatizing a public good.34 A platform is an “institution” as that
term was used by economist Douglass C. North:
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally,
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.
In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange,
whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes
the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to
understanding historical change.35
A successful platform operator is not merely the manager of activity taking place on
the platform, but also one of the regulators governing that activity. 36 A platform
operator’s power as a private regulator may be amplified by network effects, and
because it is exercised through global ICT networks, the impact can be direct and
immediate.37

II. REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND PLATFORMS
Although it may be conventional to think of enterprises such as Amazon as
subjects of nation-state regulation, the role of such enterprises in regulating
economic activity by displacing public marketplaces has also long been
recognized. 38 In recent decades, however, governance activities undertaken by
businesses have expanded beyond the market/hierarchy distinction and now include
interactions with a range of private sector, civil society, multi-stakeholder, and
hybrid public-private institutions.39 The rise of Amazon as the de facto consumer
protection authority with jurisdiction over its marketplace is an example of business
acting as a source and not merely a target of regulation. The interaction among
nation states, international organizations, and business institutions produces what
effort of learning a new system; converting data stored in the old system to formats that can
be used with the new system; and contractual restrictions that would make switching networks
a breach of contract. SHY, supra note 20, at 4–5.
33.
Id. at 5; see also VARIAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 25.
34.
See generally Robert J. Staaf, Privatization of Public Goods, 41 PUB. CHOICE
435, 435–36 (1983) (noting how technological innovation makes privatization of public
goods possible).
35.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (James Alt & Douglass C. North eds., rev. ed.1999).
36.
See Kevin S. Boudreau & Andrei Hagiu, Platform Rules: Multi-sided
Platforms as Regulators, in PLATFORMS, MARKETS AND INNOVATION 163 (Anabelle Gawer
ed., 2009); see also David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-sided
Platforms, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201, 1210 (2012).
37.
Jane K. Winn, Technical Standards as Data Protection Regulation, in
REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 191 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009).
38.
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 401–05 (1937).
39.
Eberlein et al., supra note 13, at 13.

200

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 58:193

Eberlein et al., describe as “regulatory governance.”40 By focusing on institutions
that maintain accountability, legitimacy, and rights rather than on traditional
conceptions of “law,” Eberlein et al., have developed a framework to analyze the
dynamics of regulatory governance without regard to its roots in the nation state or
elsewhere. This framework breaks down the lifecycle of regulatory governance into
the following stages: agenda setting, norm formation, implementation, monitoring,
enforcement, and review.41
Amazon derives its authority as a private regulator in part from its
ownership of the ICT platform on which its marketplaces operate and in part from
its status as a private business enterprise under the law of each country, as well as
the status of its interactions with its customers, suppliers, and employees based on
contracts. Moreover, Amazon’s market power as one of the world’s most ferocious
competitors and successful platform operators enhances its de facto regulatory
authority derived from traditional legal relations. In terms of the taxonomy of
regulatory governance activities, Amazon is engaged in the following:
Problem Definition and
Agenda Setting

Prioritize customer experience;
commerce; ubiquitous computing

omni-channel

Norm Formation

“One-Click” contracting; A-to-Z Guarantee

Implementation

Terms and Conditions; Privacy Policy

Monitoring and
Information Gathering

Data analytics from activity on Amazon
Marketplace; Amazon Web Services; Kindle

Enforcement

Exclude stakeholders from platform; chargeback
contested transactions to merchants; plus contract
and property enforcement in national legal systems

Review and Evaluation

Internal review; national government oversight

When Amazon was founded in 1994, its business model was simply online
retailer rather than multi-sided platform, as it only sold to consumers the products
that it owned.42 In 1999, it launched a service originally called zShops to allow third
parties to sell their products on its platform, a service that was later rebranded as
Amazon Marketplace.43 Third-party sellers pay nothing to list items but 15–45% in

40.
Id. at 3.
41.
Id. at 6.
42.
Hagiu & Wright, supra note 22, at 163.
43.
John Fredrick Moore, Amazon Adds Merchants, CNNMONEY (Sept. 29, 1999,
5:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/1999/09/29/technology/amazon/; Selling at Amazon.com:
zShops
Storefront,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=1161442 (last visited Jan.
16, 2016).
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“referral fees” and other charges to Amazon when an item is sold.44 In 2015, 40%
of all products sold on Amazon were sold by Amazon Marketplace sellers. 45
With regard to consumer transactions taking place within the Amazon
Marketplace, Amazon both defines and enforces the norms that apply to third-party
merchants.46 In order to inspire consumer confidence, Amazon provides Amazon
Marketplace buyers with a comprehensive “A-to-Z Guarantee” that in effect forces
third-party merchants to match its fanatical pursuit of customer satisfaction. The Ato-Z Guarantee provides refunds up to $2,500 for buyers who claim an item they
received was damaged, defective, or materially different from the item represented
on the product detail page.47 Refunds may also be provided for items that did not
arrive within the delivery window, if the seller has not voluntarily issued the
refund.48 Amazon can enforce its buyer guarantee policy by charging back refunds
against the seller, or even excluding the seller from the Amazon Marketplace:
“Sellers with excessive guarantee claims and/or service chargebacks may be subject
to warnings, suspensions, and account termination.”49
Although Amazon has considerable clout as a private regulator, it
nevertheless must rely on national legal systems for support in dealing with the worst
offenders. For example, in 2015, Amazon filed suit in Washington State against
1,000 individuals it said were selling fake reviews to Amazon Marketplace
merchants.50 The lawsuit involved trademark disparagement and breach of contract
claims based on the reviewers’ assent to Amazon’s terms of service.
Given Amazon’s strong tilt in favor of retail customers, it is not surprising
that reports of buyer fraud are widespread, as are reports of seller frustration with

44.
Selling
on
Amazon
Fee
Schedule,
AMAZON,
http://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/seller/registration/participationAgreement.html?itemID=
200336920&language=en_US&ld=SCSOAStriplogin (last visited Jan. 16, 2016); Mary
Weinstein, See on Amazon: How Much Does It Cost to Sell on Amazon?, CPC STRATEGY:
BLOG (June 23, 2014), http://www.cpcstrategy.com/blog/2014/06/sell-on-amazon-pricing/.
45.
Technologies Transforming Transportation: Is the Government Keeping Up?,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Surface Transp. And Merch. Marine Infrastructure, and
Sec., 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of Paul Misener, Vice President for Global Public
Policy, Amazon).
46.
Seller
Protection
&
Best
Practices,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_cn?ie=UTF8&nodeId=
13832211 (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
47.
About
A-to-Z
Guarantee,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200783670 (last visited
Jan. 16, 2016).
48.
A-to-Z
Guarantee
Claims
Program,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=13832181 (last
visited Jan. 16, 2016).
49.
Id.
50.
Mae Anderson, Crackdown: Amazon Sues to Stop Phony Product Reviews,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Oct.
19,
2015,
7:05
PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/c2bc7f2e4b64490db4291ed5619ff2b2/amazon-sues-reviewsellers-salvo-against-bogus-reviewers.
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Amazon’s dispute resolution procedures. 51 Amazon provides the following
guidance for sellers concerned about this type of fraud on its website:
If a seller follows the Amazon Marketplace Community Rules
when listing, selling and shipping their item and, can document
shipment to the customer or that the buyer received the correct
item, Amazon usually does not hold the seller responsible for the
reimbursement of the claim. Otherwise, reimbursement for the
claim will usually be debited from the seller’s account. 52
Discussion among sellers on Amazon’s own seller discussion forums indicates that
sellers are in fact penalized by Amazon for any A-to-Z claims, even if the buyer later
withdraws the claim, such as when a package that was delayed finally arrives. 53
While buyers are allowed to review seller performance, sellers are not permitted to
comment publicly on misconduct by buyers, leading one seller to lament:
I’ve found that recently more buyers are using [the A-to-Z
Guarantee] to specifically get free product. I mean, it’s not a secret
Amazon will send a refund for any lame reason . . . but if Amazon
is going to expect that their sellers give a FULL REFUND without
returning an item AND downgrade a seller’s reputation, then there
should be an aspect of seller protection tied to it, be it buyer ratings
or some method to know how often the customer has asked for a
refund in the past . . . 54
In the absence of a violation of national antitrust or competition law, merchants who
are dissatisfied with Amazon’s enforcement of its rules have no choice but to exit:
In the end, it is Amazon’s playing field. By selling on Amazon
you have to accept that Amazon will always put the customer first.
51.
See Jake Seilger, Is Amazon’s Marketplace Encouraging Buyers to Scam
Sellers by Filing a Refund Claim?, STORY’S STORY (Feb. 16, 2013),
http://jakeseliger.com/2013/02/16/is-amazon-coms-marketplace-encouraging-buyers-toscam-sellers-by-filing-a-refund-claim/; see also Richard Stubbings, The Dreaded A-Z Claim,
PRACTICAL ECOMMERCE (May 6, 2013), http://www.practicalecommerce.com/columns/theview-from-england/11034-The-dreaded-Amazon-A-Z-claim-; cf. Better than Outlet, Reply to
Buyer Return Different Item Scam, AMAZON SERVICES SELLER FORUMS (July 12, 2013, 8:05
AM), http://sellercentral.amazon.com/forums/message.jspa?messageID=2489867 (Amazon
Marketplace seller reporting on Seller Forum that Amazon denied a fraudulent buyer claim).
52.
Seller
Protection,
AMAZON.COM,
http://www.Amazon/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=13832211 (last visited Jan. 17,
2016).
53.
Philips Light Lounge-Ved Electricals, A-Z Guarantee Claim: Penalized for a
Claim Withdrawn by the Buyer?, AMAZON SERVICES INDIA SELLER FORUMS (Nov. 25, 2014,
5:06 PM), http://sellercentral.amazon.in/forums/message.jspa?messageID=1236715 (“We
recently had an A-Z Guarantee Claim opened by a buyer and the buyer withdrew/cancelled
his claim and yet we were penalized for the same. When we contacted Amazon, the customer
service rep replied that even if a buyer withdraws or cancels his claim, the seller will still be
penalized. This is however contradictory to Amazon’s own online help article information.”).
54.
krlpuretone, Seller Discussion - Amazon A to Z Guarantee Claims, STEVE
HOFFMAN MUSIC FORUMS (June 7, 2014), http://forums.stevehoffman.tv/threads/sellerdiscussion-amazon-a-to-z-guarantee-claims.359879/.
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You have to accept the way in which they judge their sellers. No
matter how unfair or unreasonable it seems, it is their playground,
their rules. It is better to accept this and find a way to play within
these rules, or get out before you are forced out. 55

III. NEW BASICS IN THE SHADOW OF PLATFORM GOVERNANCE
In 2005, Professor Braucher published a paper describing the 12 principles
developed by AFFECT as guidelines for electronic commerce involving
consumers. 56 She first outlined the challenges facing consumers in markets
dominated by networks and platforms. 57 Professor Braucher and all those who
contributed to the principles hoped they might be the catalyst for major reforms:
Given all these market weaknesses, a good place to begin law
reform efforts concerning software and digital content deals is
with a focus on mass-market transactions in digital projects. To
do this job well, we need to have basic principles in mind.
Although law reform could begin at either the state or federal
level, ultimately federal legislation will probably be desirable
because of the connection to federal intellectual property law and
policy involved in addressing the overreaching in non-negotiated
terms for mass-market digital products. Some state statutory
experiments could lead the way to this outcome. 58
In terms of the transnational business government framework described above, the
principles were intended to be an exercise in agenda-setting and norm formation.
The 12 principles were developed in two forms, a concise form designed
to be comprehensible to consumers and a more elaborate form intended for lawyers
and legislators. In their simplified form, they are:
I. Customers are entitled to readily find, review, and understand
proposed terms when they shop.
II. Customers are entitled to actively accept proposed terms before
they make the deal.
III. Customers are entitled to information about all known
nontrivial defects in a product before committing to the deal.
IV. Customers are entitled to a refund when the product is not of
reasonable quality.
V. Customers are entitled to have their disputes settled in a local
convenient venue.
VI. Customers are entitled to control their own computer systems.
VII. Customers are entitled to control their own data.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Stubbings, supra note 51.
See Braucher, supra note 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
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VIII. Customers are entitled to fair use, including library or
classroom use, of digital products to the extent permitted by
federal copyright law.
IX. Customers are entitled to study how a product works.
X. Customers are entitled to express opinions about products and
report their experiences with them.
XI. Customers are entitled to the free use of public domain
information.
XII. Customers are entitled to transfer products as long as they do
not retain access to them.59
In the decade following publication of the principles, progress toward
enshrining them in U.S. law is difficult to detect. While principles I and II may often
be observed in U.S. cases involving consumers and electronic commerce, 60 the
controversial but influential Hill v. Gateway61 case remains good law and arguably
violates both principles. 62 With regard to principles III and IV, American sellers
generally remain free to disclaim warranty liability for the products they sell and are
generally under no duty beyond that imposed by tort law to disclose defects. 63 The
use of arbitration terms in consumer contracts is even more widespread in America
in 2015 than it was in 2005.64 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court resoundingly rejected
the idea that American consumers have any right to have their disputes heard in a
local, convenient venue in AT&T Mobility Inc. v. Concepcion.65
American information privacy and computer security rights remain
fragmented and weak and continue to lag behind those of other jurisdictions such as
the European Union.66 The scope of the fair use defense under copyright law with
regard to digital products and electronic commerce also remains uncertain, although

59.
Id. at 8.
60.
See, e.g., Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., Civil No. 12cv418 AJB (NLS),
2012 WL 1965337 (S.D. Cal. May 31, 2012), rev’d and remanded, 771 F.3d 559 (9th Cir.
2014).
61.
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (validating “pay
now, terms later” or “rolling contracts” contract formation mechanisms while rejecting an
attempt by consumers to commence a class action against Gateway 2000 for defective
computers and enforcing the arbitration term that had not been mentioned when the Hills
placed their order by telephone but instead had been shipped in the box with the computer).
62.
The reporters of an American Law Institute project, which aimed to harmonize
consumer contract law in areas including electronic commerce, found that, in the 20 years
following the Hill v. Gateway case, it had been followed 80% of the time that similar issues
had been considered by American courts. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONSUMER CONTRACTS
27 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2015).
63.
See generally U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
64.
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1.
65.
563 U.S. 333 (2011); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463
(2015).
66.
See generally Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1978 (2013).
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the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed that before issuing takedown notices to website
operators pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, copyright owners must
first consider whether the person posting the allegedly infringing content might have
a fair use defense.67
While American consumers are generally free to post negative reviews of
products and services, they do so at the risk of being sued for defamation. 68 On the
other hand, sellers who try to prohibit leaving truthful negative reviews may be
found to have engaged in unfair trade practices. 69 While nonprofit organizations
such as Creative Commons 70 and Public.Resource.Org 71 may have increased the
volume of online materials available to the public royalty free, there is no general
right of free access to public-domain materials. The 12 principles proposed that
copies of digital media should be as freely transferable as hard copies so long as the
transferor did not retain a copy, but U.S. law today still does not recognize such a
right unless the license granted by the copyright owner includes permission to make
such transfers.
By contrast, Amazon’s focus on customer satisfaction has led it to comply
voluntarily or come close to complying with almost all of the 12 principles:

67.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 2015).
68.
With regard to state law defamation claims for negative reviews, see, e.g.,
Rahbar v. Batoon, A136463, 2014 WL 346910, at *4–5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2014). But cf.
Pham v. Lee, H039184, 2014 WL 6992251, at *4–7 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2014); Adi
Kamdar, Amid Further Lawsuits, a Federal Anti-SLAPP Law Is Sorely Needed, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/amid-furtherlawsuits-federal-anti-slapp-law-sorely-needed.
69.
The FTC has recently taken action against vendors who tried to prohibit
consumers from posting negative reviews about their products. Press Release, Fed. Trade
Commission, FTC Sues Marketers Who Used “Gag Clauses,” Monetary Threats, and
Lawsuits to Stop Negative Consumer Reviews for Unproven Weight-Loss Products (Sept.
28, 2015), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/09/ftc-sues-marketers-whoused-gag-clauses-monetary-threats-lawsuits.
70.
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://www.creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited
Jan. 17, 2016).
71.
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, http://www.public.resource.org (last visited Jan. 17,
2016).
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Amazon

II

Accessible, Comprehensible
Terms

Posted on the bottom of every
page; links to relevant content
prominently displayed and
embedded in purchase and
return processes

III

Actively accept terms before
being bound

Unambiguous
placement interface

IIII

Right to information about
defects before purchase

Customer reviews provide
information about defects
before purchase

IIV

Right to a refund if not
reasonable quality

Right to a refund in most cases
without regard to quality

VV

Right to settle disputes at
convenient venue

Right to use local smallclaims court preserved

VVI

Customer
computer

No use of spyware

VVII

Customer controls own data

Right to opt-out of interest
based
ads,
information
sharing, communications

VVIII

Freedom to enjoy fair use
rights

Entitled to download digital
content to unlimited number
of devices; Kindle Online
Lending Library for Prime
members

IIX

Freedom to
products work

how

Reverse engineering of Kindle
was not blocked until recently

XX

Freedom to express opinions
and report experiences

Freedom to express opinions
and report experiences

XXI

Free use of public domain
material

Free access to public domain
materials in Kindle

XXII

Entitled to transfer if no copy
retained

Entitled to download digital
content to unlimited number
of devices

controls

study

own

Amazon is clearly in compliance with principles I, II, III, and IV.

order
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Although its customers are generally required to arbitrate disputes, thus
reducing the risk of class-action lawsuits, Amazon agrees to appear in the local
small-claims court of any individual buyer who prefers that route to arbitration.72
Given that Amazon Web Services is the largest provider of cloud
computing services in America, 73 Amazon is presumably subjecting all its own
customer data to intense scrutiny using “Big Data” analytics.74 Amazon provides
mechanisms for any customer that prefers not to be subject to that kind of scrutiny
to “opt out” of it, however.75 While Amazon became embroiled in some high profile
information-privacy-breach litigation in the 1990s,76 it has since maintained a low
profile and managed to avoid further controversy in the area of information
privacy.77
Amazon protects the one-sided right of buyers to review sellers so
vigorously that some sellers believe they cannot defend themselves from buyer
fraud.78 Through the Kindle e-book reader, Amazon has made it easier than ever
before for consumers to access public domain works. While Amazon does not
literally allow licensees of digital content to transfer copies to nonlicensees, Amazon
Prime service subscribers may achieve a similar result with the ability to download
content to an unlimited number of devices.79
While Amazon might once have tolerated “jailbreaks” of its Kindle ereader, it is now very serious about locking down the device to prevent tinkering. 80
Thus, the only one of the 12 principles for which Amazon is clearly out of
compliance is principle IX governing reverse engineering.
Not only has Amazon come closer to compliance with the 12 principles
than any country in the world, it has also served as a transmission vector by bringing

72.
Conditions
of
Use,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=ap_desktop_footer_cou?ie=UT
F8&nodeId=508088 (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
73.
Barb Darrow, Shocker! Amazon Remains the Top Dog in Cloud by Far, but
Microsoft, Google Make Strides, FORTUNE (May 19, 2015, 10:28 AM),
http://fortune.com/2015/05/19/amazon-tops-in-cloud/.
74.
J.P. Mangalindan, Amazon’s Recommendation Secret, FORTUNE (July 30,
2012, 11:09 AM), http://fortune.com/2012/07/30/amazons-recommendation-secret/.
75.
Amazon.com
Privacy
Notice,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=ap_desktop_footer_privacy_not
ice?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496 (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
76.
See, e.g., Sklare v. Alexa Internet (In re Amazon.com/Alexa Internet Privacy
Litig.), No. 1346, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8201, at *2–4 (J.P.M.L. June 7, 2000).
77.
John P. Mello, Jr., Data Requests Put Amazon Between Rock, Hard Place, ECOM. TIMES (June 23, 2015, 1:45 PM), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/82207.html.
78.
See, e.g., Stubbings, supra note 51.
79.
Marshall Honorof, What Is Amazon Prime?, TOM’S GUIDE (Dec. 28, 2015,
10:07
AM),
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/what-is-amazon-prime,news-18041.html
(“Amazon Households allow two adults and up to four children to share digital Amazon
content.”).
80.
Amazon Quietly Bricked Jailbroken Kindle Devices Last Year, TECHDIRT
(May 24, 2015), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150321/13350230396/while-brickingjailbroken-fire-tvs-last-year-amazon-did-same-to-kindle-devices.shtml.
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European consumer rights into the American market. 81 In 2000, the EU ECommerce Directive mandated that online vendors in Europe make clear to website
visitors what technical steps were required to form an online contract as well as the
means for identifying and correcting errors prior to placing an order. 82 To comply,
Amazon was among the first American retailers to display a visual representation of
the transaction flow across the top of the screen during the order process,
highlighting the current step in the process while making all steps visible. This visual
cue has now become ubiquitous in American online commerce in the absence of any
legislative mandate, suggesting that Amazon’s competitors may have followed its
lead. Amazon’s 30-day return policy exceeds the mandatory 14-day right of return
imposed by Consumer Rights Directive.83
Amazon’s unflagging attention to customer satisfaction, however, comes
at the cost of profoundly problematic relations with its employees and suppliers. 84 It
has repeatedly been criticized for the grueling conditions to which its workers are
subjected in its distribution and logistics network. 85 The intensity and harshness of
Amazon’s culture apparently extends all the way up the hierarchy to top
management.86 Amazon enjoys a virtual monopsony in many markets such as online
book sales, and has been criticized for abusing that market power.87 While Walmart
was once the world leader in the relentless pursuit of efficiency to bring “everyday
81.
Jane K. Winn & Mark Webber, The Impact of EU Unfair Contract Terms Law
on US Business-to-Consumer Internet Merchants, 62 BUS. LAW. 209 (2006).
82.
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June, 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic
Commerce, in the Internal Market, O.J. (L. 178) 1–16.
83.
Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
Oct., 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directive
85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with
EEA Relevance, O.J. (L 304), art. 9 (“Right of withdrawal 1. Save where the exceptions
provided for in Article 16 apply, the consumer shall have a period of 14 days to withdraw
from a distance or off-premises contract, without giving any reason, and without incurring
any costs other than those provided for in Article 13(2) and Article 14.”). Under the former
Distance Selling Directive, the right of return was for 7 days.
84.
See Kantor & Streitfeld, supra note 24; Calamur, supra note 24.
85.
Hal Bernton & Susan Kelleher, Amazon Warehouse Jobs Push Workers to
Physical
Limit,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Apr.
3,
2012,
9:30
PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon-warehouse-jobs-push-workers-to-physicallimit/; Nathaniel Mott, Don’t Be Surprised at how Amazon Treats Its Workers, GIGAOM (Aug.
18, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://gigaom.com/2015/08/18/dont-be-surprised-at-how-amazontreats-its-workers/; Spencer Soper, Inside Amazon’s Warehouse, MORNING CALL (Aug. 17,
2015, 12:13 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/local/amazon/mc-allentown-amazoncomplaints-20110917-story.html.
But
see
Working
at
Amazon,
AMAZON,
www.amazon.com/fcpractices (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (pointing out that wages and
benefits for workers in Amazon fulfillment centers are above the national average for retailer
workers)
86.
Kantor & Streitfeld, supra note 24; Calamur, supra note 24.
87.
See Joshua Gans, Amazon: It’s Not the Power, It’s the Lost Focus, DIGITOPOLY
(Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.digitopoly.org/2014/10/20/amazon-its-not-the-power-its-thelost-focus; see also Krugman, supra note 10. But cf. R.A., Big Bad Amazon, ECONOMIST (Oct.
20, 2014, 8:19 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/10/market-power.
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low prices” to its customers, that mantle has now passed to Amazon, whose market
capitalization exceeded Walmart’s for the first time in 2015. 88 While Walmart’s
unfair or even illegal labor practices have attracted widespread attention, the fact
that Amazon’s labor practices do not appear to be any better than those of Walmart
has not been as widely noted.89

IV. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PLATFORM GOVERNANCE
With regard to activities that take place within the “ecosystem” of the
platform, the regulatory authority exercised by global platform operators may rival
that of national governments. However, the exercise of that regulatory authority is
not normally legitimated by the same mechanisms as government regulation:
representative democracy or judicial review. Any legitimacy that platform operators
enjoy as regulators of activity taking place on the platform is derived from their
power in markets, as well as contract and property rights established under national
legal systems. The power and authority of national governments—the traditional
nexus of legitimate authority in modern societies—is declining, but widely
recognized measures of political legitimacy for platform governance equivalent to
representative democracy or judicial review have not yet emerged. 90 Amazon’s
intense focus on customer satisfaction combined with its status as a private regulator
currently permit it to externalize many of the costs of achieving high levels of
customer satisfaction onto those stakeholder groups most excluded from its
governance processes.
If increased enforcement efforts increase compliance in one area by
triggering an increase in violations in another area, the result of such negative
spillover effects is like squeezing a balloon. Although the term “balloon effect” was
first used with reference to the failure of the U.S. War on Drugs to stem the tide of
drug trafficking in North and South America, 91 a similar dynamic may be at play
when the 12 principles are applied to private regulators such as Amazon. While the
explicit goal of the 12 principles was fairness to consumers, the implicit goal was to
make the operation of markets fairer generally. If the rights of workers and suppliers
were not addressed explicitly in the 12 principles, it was doubtless because the
drafters assumed that there would be other laws in place to maintain an acceptable
88.
Matt Krantz, Amazon Just Surpassed Walmart in Market Cap, USA TODAY
(July
23,
2015,
6:44
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2015/07/23/amazon-worth-morewalmart/30588783/.
89.
See Rob Cox, Why Amazon May Take a Page from Walmart’s Labor
Playbook,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
17,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/business/dealbook/why-amazon-may-take-a-pagefrom-walmarts-labor-playbook.html; see also Alex Planes, To Win the Holidays,
Amazon.com Pushes Employees to the Limit, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 23, 2014, 4:00 PM),
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/11/23/to-win-the-holidays-amazoncom-stripsits-workers-o.aspx.
90.
Anne Peters et al., Toward Non-State Actors as Effective, Legitimate and
Accountable Standard-Setters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 492, 502 (Anne
Peters et al. eds., 2009).
91.
Balloon Effect, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balloon_effect (last
visited Jan. 17, 2016).
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minimum level of protection for workers and suppliers. If the drafters of the 12
principles could have foreseen that significant progress in implementation could
only be achieved by the “Walmartization” of labor and producer markets, they might
have drafted the principles differently.
The California Supply Chain Transparency Act of 2010 requires large
retailers and manufacturers to provide consumers with information regarding their
efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their supply chains and to
educate consumers on how to purchase goods that are produced by companies that
responsibly manage their supply chains. 92 Accordingly, retailers and manufacturers
doing business in California with worldwide gross receipts in excess of $100 million
are required to publish annual reports describing their anti-slavery and antitrafficking efforts.93 The legislative purpose of the California law is to keep global
supply chains free of products whose production involved human rights abuses.94 A
modified form of the California Supply Chain Transparency Act might help
consumers understand whether the pricing policies of domestic American platforms
like Amazon are based on unfair labor and trading practices.
Although few would claim that the business practices of Walmart or
Amazon’s operations in the United States violate the human rights of their
employees or suppliers, many might argue that there is an unacceptably high social
cost to the relentless pursuit of lower retail prices.95 In recent years, the concept of
a “living wage” has gained prominence in American politics and could be
substituted for slavery and human trafficking in a mandatory disclosure law imposed
on employers such as Amazon and Walmart.96 Major employers including Facebook
and Ikea have recently announced voluntary commitments to ensuring that their
employees and contractors receive a living wage. 97 Massachusetts Institute of
Technology has created an online living wage calculator to make it easy to estimate
the cost of living in different locations around the country. 98 If living wage
disclosures calibrated to variations in local cost of living were provided to American

92.
Transparency in Supply Chains Act, S.B. 657, 2009–2010 Leg. Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2009–2010), codified as CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2010).
93.
Id.
94.
Norman L. Greene & Eric Beinhart, Combating Human Trafficking—The U.S.
Government’s Response, 20 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 49, 79 (2013).
95.
CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT: HOW THE WORLD'S MOST
POWERFUL COMPANY REALLY WORKS, AND HOW IT'S TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY (2006); Vern Kopytoff, How Amazon Crushed the Union Movement, TIME (Jan.
16, 2014), http://time.com/956/how-amazon-crushed-the-union-movement/.
96.
Melena Ryzik, ‘I, Too, Am America’ Shares Snapshots from Workers Living
on the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2015, at C1.
97.
See Jean McGregor, Ikea to Raise Workers’ Pay to a ‘Living Wage,’ WASH.
POST
(June
26,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/onleadership/wp/2014/06/26/ikea-to-raise-workers-pay-to-a-living-wage/; see also Rebecca R.
Ruiz, White House and Labor Advocates Praise Move by Facebook for Higher Wages, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2015, at B4.
98.
Amy K. Glasmeier, MASS. INST. OF TECH., http://www.livingwage.mit.edu/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
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consumers pursuing “everyday low prices,” they might be in a better position to
assess the impact their consumption decisions may have. 99
While it is unclear precisely how much impact disclosure laws alone can
have on consumer behavior,100 it is clear that simply mandating the public disclosure
of information likely to be viewed unfavorably by a significant proportion of the
public might have some effect on the behavior of companies concerned about their
brand.101 On the other hand, any attempt by governments to impose “command and
control” mandates dictating the terms and conditions under which transactions take
place within “multi-sided platforms” would be almost certain to fail.102

CONCLUSION
The 12 principles of fair electronic commerce published by AFFECT in
2005 focused on empowering consumers acting in information markets. They were
informed by public debate triggered by the drafting project first known as UCC
Article 2B and later finalized as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act. They were drafted in broad, general terms in the hope of influencing public
debate and law reform in the future. In the decade following publication of the 12
principles, there has been very little evidence that law reform efforts in the United
States are moving generally in the direction of strengthening legal guarantees of the
substantive fairness of online consumer transactions.
Even in the absence of law reform, however, many American consumers
are treated very fairly either because they shop on Amazon or they shop at a different
online retail site competing to provide the same high level of customer service that
Amazon has achieved. Not only has Amazon as a private global regulator made
more progress in implementing the 12 principles than any government has, it has
also put pressure on American competitors to comply with European online
consumer protection laws by its own example of voluntary compliance in America.
At one level, the triumph of market-driven consumer protection in the absence of
government mandates validates American confidence in the free market. At another
level, however, if Amazon’s zeal for customer satisfaction is being paid for by unfair
treatment of its employees and suppliers, then that contradicts the social justice
objectives underlying the 12 principles.
A global “secession of the successful” away from national commercial and
consumer laws applied in public markets to private regulation applied in global
platforms may not be inevitable, however. If the drafters of the 12 principles were
given the opportunity to reframe their project in light of the last decade of experience

99.
See Ruiz, supra note 97.
100.
Lauren Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155,
1162–63 (2013).
101.
Cory Bennett, SEC Weighs Cybersecurity Disclosure Rules, HILL (Jan. 14,
2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/229431-sec-weighs-cybersecuritydisclosure-rules.
102.
See Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Introduction to EXPLAINING
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 1 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann
Nielsen eds., 2011); see also Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation,
71 MOD. L. REV. 59 (2008).
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with global platform operators, they might wish to complement the transactional
focus of the principles with a focus on insuring that all stakeholder groups
participating in global business “ecosystems” such as Amazon are treated fairly. One
such complimentary strategy might involve incentives for businesses—especially
those with business models focused on relentlessly lowering prices—to disclose
publicly whether those low prices were compatible with their employees and
suppliers earning a living wage.
This Article commemorates the life and work of Professor Jean Braucher,
a tireless advocate for the application of social justice norms to the operation of
markets. She helped develop principles aimed at assuring fair treatment for
consumers engaged in transactions online or for digital products. She might have
been surprised to learn that the first jurisdiction to implement systematically almost
all of the principles she advocated was a private enterprise operating as a global
platform. In any event, she would have expected global private regulators to be held
to the same social justice norms as the governments whose national legal systems
they displace.

